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ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW
AND UNCONSCIOUS SYMBOLISM
C. G. Schoenfeld*
"And the whole earth was of one language, and of one
speech"-so begins the Old Testament story of the tower of
Babel, a story that may be no more than myth or fable. Yet
psychoanalysts have learned that a universal language does
exist-the symbolic language of the unconscious.
Gaining familiarity with this archaic symbolic language-
and more especially, learning to translate its key "words"-ought
prove extraordinarily useful to lawyers. For one thing, a lawyer
who familiarizes himself with unconscious symbolism ought be
far better able to predict when unconscious ideas and emotions
are likely to attach themselves to and distort the law.
There is, for example, no self-evident or a priori reason why
unconscious conflicts regarding mother or birth ought affect law
governing the disposition of land or law concerning the rights
of passengers on seagoing vessels. But psychoanalysts have
discovered that, on an unconscious level, land (more especially,
the earth) is among the most frequent of mother symbols, and
birth is almost always represented by some reference to water.
Hence an unconscious connection exists between mother and
land, birth and water-and this archaic symbolic relationship
helps make it possible for unconscious conflicts pertaining to
mother and birth to influence real property law and admiralty
law respectively. Indeed, herein may be found one of the reasons
why, to this very day, real property law and admiralty law are
riddled with anachronisms and archaic concepts.
Though admittedly conjectural, these suggestions concerning
the possible influence of unconscious conflicts regarding mother
or birth upon real property law or admiralty law foreshadow
the unexpected, and often startling, findings about law that
await lawyers who gain a working knowledge of unconscious
symbolism. And to help lawyers acquire this knowledge, psycho-
analytic discoveries concerning unconscious symbolism will be
detailed, an attempt will be made to apply these discoveries to
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the law, and-perhaps most important-reforms in the law
suggested by this material will be examined.
A symbol is something that stands for something else. The
word "scarf," for instance, is a symbol: it stands for a broad
piece of cloth usually worn about the neck. A white flag may
also serve as a symbol: its display may reveal a desire to sur-
render, or to hold a parley, or the like. Both the word "scarf"
and the white flag are conventional symbols: what they stand
for is simply a matter of convention or agreement. A scarf
could, for example, be symbolized by the letters C-H-A-I-R, or
T-A-B-L-E, or whatever; and a desire to surrender or to hold a
parley could be symbolized by a brown flag, a blue flag-or
indeed, no flag at all.
Of far greater interest to the psychoanalyst, however, are
symbols related to what they represent not primarily-or at
all-by convention or agreement, but rather by an unconsciously
recognized or created bond.
Sometimes this unconscious bond between a symbol and what
it stands for is entirely individual.
"Let us assume that someone has had a saddening experience
in a certain city; when he hears the name of that city, he
will easily connect the name with a mood of sadness, just
as he would connect it with a mood of joy had his experience
been a happy one. Quite obviously there is nothing in the
nature of the city that is either sad or joyful. It is the
individual experience connected with the city that makes
it a symbol of a mood." 1
At other times, the unconscious meaning of a symbol may be
shared by a limited number of persons or by a certain group.
What kleptomaniacs steal, for example, is frequently equated
in their unconscious with milk or affection.
Certain symbols-called by psychoanalysts universal sym-
bols-have the same unconscious meaning for practically every-
body. Blindness, for instance, is almost always equated uncons-
ciously with castration; and a similarly close unconscious rela-
tionship exists between money (gold, especially) and filth.
Universal symbols are also characterized by their ubiquity: they
1. FROMM, THE FORGOTTEN LANGUAGE 14-15 (1951).
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are writ large upon such apparently unconnected matters as
dreams, rituals, witticisms, myths, neurotic symptoms, fairy
tales, and the speech of schizophrenics.
"One of the most amazing features of ... [universal] sym-
bolism is the remarkable ubiquity of the same symbols,
which are to be found, not only in different fields of thought,
dreams, wit, insanity, poetry . . . but among different races
at different epochs of the world's history. A symbol which
today we find, for instance, in an obscene joke is also to be
found in a mythical cult of Ancient Greece, and another
that we come across only in dream analysis was used
thousands of years ago in the sacred books of the East."'2
Unconscious symbols are countable in the thousands. Yet
the ideas or themes they-and especially universal unconscious
symbols-represent are usually limited to such matters as birth,
death, love (sex), ideas of the self and of close blood relatives
(or their surrogates).
The vast majority of unconscious symbols are sexual; in fact,
there are more symbols of the male phallus than all other symbols
combined. Of particular interest to lawyers, however, are
unconscious parent-symbols. As Freud pointed out, kings,
queens, and "other exalted personages" often serve as parent-
substitutes ;3 and judges are likely to rank high on the list of
"other exalted personages."'4
"The after-effect of childhood experience is particularly
strong, if we encounter figures which later in life play, in
effect, a similar role to that played by the closest early as-
sociations. Often enough the father represents the judge
to the child. And so it happens that later the judge re-
presents the father in man's unconscious."5
Employers may also symbolize parents in the unconscious; and,
as will be seen, this is likely to complicate labor relations and
labor law. 6
2. Jones, The Theory of Symbolism, in PAPERS ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 101 (5th
ed. 1950).
3. FREUD, A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOANALYSIS 160 (Permabooks
ed. 1957).
4. See REIWALD, SOCIETY AND ITS CRIMINALS 42-65 (1950).
5. Id. at 44.
6. Morris, The Psychoanalysis of Labor Strikes, 10 LAB. L.J. 833 (1959). See
also text accompanying notes 8-22 infra.
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Relevant here is the psychoanalytic discovery that the
feelings of a child regarding his parents are ambivalent, that
he directs towards them impulses not only of affection and love,
but also of hostility and hatred. Further, these impulses may
become and remain unconscious; and when adulthood is reached,
they may help to mold attitudes towards parent-substitutes. 7
Similarly, a child is frequently beset by angry and hostile feelings
concerning his brothers and sisters, feelings that often enter and
luxuriate in his unconscious, later attaching themselves to and
distorting his relationships with classmates, colleagues, and other
sibling-figures.
Offhand, the law of agency would seem to provide an ap-
propriate starting point for applying psychoanalytic findings
concerning unconscious parent-symbolism to the law. For one
thing, the principal-agent relationship appears likely to be un-
consciously equated at times with the parent-child relationship.
Agency law, however, has become relatively well-settled.
"The reading of the many cases involving agency decided since
the publication of the Restatement reveals little to excite
surprise. As to most matters the subject has become static.
Although there is some deepening of emphasis in places, as
in the expanding area in which an employer is liable for the
acts of a servant or contractor, there has been recently no
significant change in approach. ' '8
Because of this, attempting to apply psychoanalytic conclusions
regarding unconscious parent-symbolism to the law of agency
would seem to be, at least for the present, an intellectual exercise
of doubtful practical value.
Unlike agency law, labor law is in flux. Hence any knowledge
gained from applying psychoanalytic discoveries about uncons-
cious parent-symbolism to problems with which labor law is
concerned might well prove of immediate value to those who
seek to mold labor law. Indeed, it is this practical end that
prompts consideration here of violence in labor relations-specifi-
cally, the violence that so often accompanies strikes.
7. "The King is one of the most regular unconscious symbols for the father,
the Queen for the mother, and so on. In Great Britain, we have a rather happy
arrangement whereby the ambivalent attitude towards the father is dealt with
by dividing his public representative into two persons. The head of the executive,
The Prime Minister, is periodically cast from power and politically annihilated,
while the respect due to the father is reserved for another person." JONES, WHAT
Is PSYCHOANALYSIS? 87 (1948).
8. Seavey, Agency Since the Restatement, in STUDIES IN AGENCY 161 (1949).
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The recent strike conducted by the United Automobile
Workers Union against the Kohler Company of Wisconsin was
marked by considerable violence. In fact, it has been charged
that "the United Automobile Workers Union engaged in sus-
tained violence which covered almost the whole range of ille-
gality, stopping just short of murder." 9 Shocking this violence
most certainly was. Yet it was as nothing compared with the
violence that has all too frequently accompanied labor disputes
in the United States since the Civil War. During the Railway
Strike of 1877, for example, several hundred persons were
killed and more than ten million dollars worth of property was
destroyed.'0
Finding impressive-sounding reasons for such violent be-
havior presents no problem. If blame cannot be placed upon
"industrial oppression" by employers," then, perhaps, it can be
placed upon the "arrogant impudence" of labor leaders. 12 Or if,
perchance, neither explanation seems adequate, then picketing
and other normal strike practices can always be faulted. 13
Often disregarded, however, are the tension and emotionalism
that almost invariably accompany a strike. That a strike is a
profoundly emotional experience may seem too obvious to men-
tion. Yet as such, a strike is likely to serve as an occasion for
venting aggressive impulses. 14  And perhaps more important,
a strike may well provide an opportunity for displacing un-
conscious hostility regarding parents onto employers. 15
As has been pointed out, unconscious feelings concerning
parents usually range from affection and love to hostility and
hatred. And these unconscious feelings may help to mold at-
titudes towards employers; since, as has also been mentioned,
9. Preface to PETRO, THE KOHLER STRIKE: UNION VIOLENCE AND ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW at v (1961).
10. See RAYBACK, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LABOR 133-36 (1959).
11. Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence upon the Development of
Collective Bargaining, 50 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1076 (1937).
12. PETRO, THE KOHLER STRIKE: UNION VIOLENCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
93 (1961).
13. See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 141-42 (1961) : "There is and can be
no such thing as peaceful picketing, any more than there can be chaste vulgarity,
or peaceful mobbing, or lawful lynching." PETRO, THE LABOR PoLICY OF THE FREE
SOCIETY 196-97 (1957).
14. STAGNER, PSYCHOLOGY OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 416 (1956) : "A second
major feature of the strike is that it is an opportunity for expressing aggres-
sion .... The strike atmosphere encourages and indeed even seems to sanction the
open expression of hostility."
15. Morris, The Psychoanalysis of Labor Strikes, 10 LAB. L.J. 833-41 (1959).
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employers are likely to be unconsciously equated with parents.
In fact, an employer may sense that his employees react to him
as though he were a parent of theirs, and may take advantage
(undue or otherwise) of the friendly and affectionate feelings
displaced onto him.
But when a strike takes place, such warm feelings tend to
disappear. Rather, the strike seems to activate angry and
violent impulses-including unconscious hostility towards pa-
rents. This unconscious hostility (coupled with other aggressive
impulses) is then likely to be displaced onto the employer (a
far more acceptable target for aggression than parents)-and
violence may well occur. Indeed, displaced hostility-and not
economic issues-may actually be the root cause of many strikes
and of the violence that so often accompanies them.16
Now if the violence that frequently erupts during strikes is
in part attributable to the aggressive urges strikes activate and
to the hostility displaced from parents onto employers, then even
if employers (and union leaders, for that matter) behave in
exemplary fashion during strikes, violence is still likely to occur.
Further, assuming that one of the functions of law is to prevent
or minimize outbursts of violence, then it would seem to follow
that the law ought provide effective means of curbing violence
when strikes are called.
Experience has shown that the issuance of a timely injunction
is perhaps the only really effective method (other than employ-
ing inordinate numbers of policemen, National Guardsmen, and
the like) of controlling violence when strikes occur. 17 Unfortu-
nately, however, beginning late in the 1880's and continuing into
the early 1930's, injunctions were used in labor disputes to
disrupt and prevent legitimate union activity.18 Reacting against
this misuse of injunctions, Congress passed the Norris-Laguardia
Act in 1932,19 a statute that removed from the federal courts
"jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or
permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a
16. Id. at 833: "In some instances wage issues are introduced only as an after-
thought, after a strike has begun. The strike that is a spontaneous explosion of
aggressive tensions must be made to appear rational." STAGNER, PSYCHOLOGY OF
INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 424 (1956).
17. See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 192 (1961) ; PETRO, THE LABOR POLICY
OF THE FREE SOCIETY 272-80 (1957).
18. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 99-104 (1961). See generally FRANx-
FURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
19. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1952).
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labor dispute. ' 20  Similar laws passed by state legislatures, as
well as Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the preemptive
role of federal law in labor relations, have severely restricted the
right of state courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes.21
Thus the one legal weapon experience has shown to be really
effective in curbing violence when strikes occur is, for all practi-
cal purposes, no longer available.
Because of this, the Norris-Laguardia Act and analogous
state laws must be repealed, insofar as they deny to courts the
injunctive powers needed to control labor violence quickly and
effectively. Unlike the early 1930's when the Norris-Laguardia
Act was passed, labor unions are now well-entrenched, extremely
powerful, and apparently a permanent fixture in labor relations.
Further, the rights of unions are now secured by the National
Labor Relations Act and protected by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board. Hence there would seem to be little danger in
giving back to the federal courts (and to state courts, where
necessary) the right to issue injunctions when violence erupts
during strikes.
The violence bred by strikes-indeed, labor relations itself-
provides only a starting point for applying psychoanalytic
knowledge concerning unconscious parent-symbolism to the law.
For example, proceeding upon the assumption that fiduciaries
may serve as unconscious parent-symbols, an investigation of
the effect of unconscious ideas about parents upon the legal
powers of trustees, guardians, and the like, might well prove of
value. Deserving of immediate attention, however, are the law's
most important parent-symbols-courts, and the judges who
serve on them.
To suggest that the Supreme Court of the United States
is not a only a court but also a symbol is hardly to advance
a novel thesis. More than twenty-five years ago, Thurman
Arnold asserted that the Supreme Court was America's "most
important symbol of government. 2 2 And within a year or two
thereafter, Max Lerner declared that the Supreme Court had
20. Id. at § 1, 29 U.S.C. at § 101. Injunctions are permitted, however, if
certain extraordinary stringent requirements are met. See Accommodation of the
Norris-Laguardia Act to other Federal Statutes, 72 HARV. L. REV. 354, 356 (1958).
21. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 530-40 (1961) ; PETRO, THE LABOR POLICY
OF THE FREE SOCIETY 276 (1957). See generally Cox, Federalism in the Law of
Labor Relations, 67 HAEV. L. REV. 1297 (1954).
22. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 196 (1935).
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become a symbol of sureness and stability; that as such, it ful-
filled needs once satisfied by the kingships of Europe; that,
indeed, the Court had "a strong symbolic hold over the Ameri-
can mind. '23 Perhaps a more precise way of expressing all
this would be to say that the Supreme Court of the United States
is, for most Americans, an unconscious parent-symbol.
Be this as it may, the assumption that the Court often serves
as an unconscious parent-symbol is likely to help explain such
matters as the inordinate-nay, morbid-preoccupation of some
persons with what the 'Court will or will not do. For example,
endless speculating concerning future decisions of the Court
may well reflect an undue unconscious preoccupation with
parental reactions and judgments.24 Further, the knowledge
that unconscious feelings towards parents range from love to
hatred-indeed, are usually ambivalent-may help to explain
why some persons venerate the Supreme Court, why others
abhor it, and why the emotions of many people regarding it
swing back and forth from one extreme to the other. In this
light, consider the emotional storm aroused in 1937 by President
Rooesvelt's court-packing plan.
Roosevelt's plan to overcome the opposition of the Supreme
Court to New Deal policies by obtaining congressional authority
to appoint an extra Supreme Court Justice for each member
of the Court who refused to retire at the age of seventy-this
plan may have been so outrageous that the furious opposition
it evoked may well have been justified. Recall, however, that
in 1937 the country was in the throes of a seemingly endless
and ever-worsening depression. Yet despite this, the Supreme
Court had repeaiedly struck down iegisiation tnaT Tne aaminis-
tration believed necessary to help save the country's economy
from total collapse. And Roosevelt feared that all other New
Deal legislation was likely to suffer a similar fate at the hands
of a Supreme Court that had come "virtually to exercise the
functions of a 'super-legislature,' to be what Harold J. Laski
termed 'a third chamber in the United States.' "'2 Thus there
23. Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1291,
1292, 1306 (1937).
24. Attempts have even been made to predict mathematically (!) how the
Court will decide the cases that come before it. For articles describing these
attempts, see MURPHY & PRITCHETT, COURTS. JUDGES AND POLITICS: AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 535-43 (1961).
25. SCHWARTZ, THE, SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION xn
RETROSPECT 14 (1957).
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was good reason for Roosevelt's desire to appoint additional
Justices to the Supreme Court-and it is not at all obvious why
the plan aroused such widespread and incredibly furious opposi-
tion. Certainly no such reaction was anticipated by the ad-
ministration, which shortly before the plan was announced
had won a landslide victory at the polls.
But once the assumption is made that the Supreme Court is
an unconscious parent-symbol, then the emotional storm aroused
by the court-packing plan no longer appears so inexplicable.
That is, if a person unconsciously looks upon the Supreme Court
as a parent-substitute, then any attempt to reduce or to destroy
the Court's power might well be unconsciously interpreted by
him as an attack upon his parents, as an attempt to render
them impotent. Such an unconscious reaction to Roosevelt's
plan, for instance, would almost inevitably arouse powerful un-
conscious forces and precipitate a most violent reaction. Because
of this, the furious opposition evoked by the court-packing plan
of 19,37 no longer appears so inexplicable, once the Supreme
Court's role as an unconscious parent-symbol is taken into ac-
count.
26
Though the extent to which the Supreme Court is regarded
as an unconscious parent-symbol is admittedly debatable, there
can be little doubt that the judges who serve on this court, and
on other courts as well, are often unconsciously looked upon as
father-substitutes. In short, as the father once represented the
judge during childhood-
"To the child the father is the Infallible Judge, the Maker
of definite rules of conduct. He knows precisely what is
right and what is wrong and, as head of the family, sits in
judgment and punishes misdeeds. ' 27
-so does the judge represent the father during adulthood.28
Now if a judge is unconsciously regarded as a father-sub-
stitute, then unconscious ideas and feelings concerning the
fathers of those with whom he comes into contact are likely
to be deflected onto him. This may help to explain why some
26. The suggestions in the text provide, at best, a partial explanation of the
emotional upheaval evoked by Roosevelt's court-packing plan. Many factors
having nothing whatsoever to do with parent-symbolism undoubtedly played a part
in arousing opposition to the plan.
27. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 18 (1949).
28. REIWALD, SOCIETY AND ITS CRIMINALS 42-65 (1950).
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lawyers feel compelled to venerate the judges before whom they
appear-why judges are, by and large, the heroes of the bar.
And by the same token, the deflection of antagonistic father-
oriented feelings onto judges may help to explain why many
criminals-and some lawyers as well-adopt an abusive and
antagonistic attitude towards the judges before whom they
appear.
Further, not only may a judge stir up unconscious father-
oriented feelings in others, but in himself as well. A man's being
a judge may arouse in his own unconscious the childhood wish
to be in every way like his father.29 The resurrection of this
wish might not be objectionable if the judge's father ought have
been a judge himself. But if the judge's father had been unduly
strict or severe, then the judge's modelling himself on his father
might well result in the dispensation of over-severe "justice."
As Paul Reiwald (a psychoanalytically-oriented Swiss attorney)
has pointed out: "Many harsh and over-severe judgments are
traceable to the fact that the judge once identified himself with
a harsh father. '30
Conversely, a man's becoming a judge may stir up in him-
self an unconscious desire to outshine his father in the eyes
of others (the mother especially).31 Acting under the spur of
this desire, a judge may so conduct himself in the courtroom
as to rivet attention not upon the issues, but upon himself.
Harold D. Lasswell has described such a judge-a certain
"Judge Z," who "managed to keep in the center of attention in
court by the use of many subtle devices, such as permitting
many shades of expression to cross his countenance, playing
off one counsel against another, and abruptly shifting his
favors. '3 2 To help eliminate such behavior, the Canons Of
Judicial Ethics warn judges against "unconsciously falling into
the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts
instead of the courts for the litigants. ' '33
Finally, mention ought be made of the possibility that un-
conscious feelings concerning a judge's father, as well as other
29. Children of five or so years of age normally try to model themselves on the
parent of the same sex. See, e.g., BALINT, THE EARLY YEARS OF LIFE: A PSYCHO-
ANALYTIC STUDY 108-09 (1954).
30. REIWALD, SOCIETY AND ITS CRImINALS 51 (1950).
31. A desire to usurp the father's place with the mother usually appears by
the time a boy is four years old. See, e.g., JONES, HAMLET AND OEDIPUS 85-86
32. LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY 84 (1962).
33. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 275 (1953).
(1955).
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unconscious urges and strivings, affect the legal opinions that
the judge renders. Much this possibility was raised more than
forty years ago by Theodore Schroeder, who suggested that
judicial acts reflect "emotional tones or values . . acquired in
past experiences ... long after the experiences themselves have
been crowded out of consciousness. 3 4  Unfortunately, how-
ever, Schroeder went on to contend that every judicial opinion
"is little more than a special plea made in defense of impulses
which are largely unconscious."3 5
This further contention by Schroeder fails to convince, for
(among other things) it ignores completely the role that logic
and reason have played in the growth of Anglo-American law.
As -Morris R. Cohen has pointed out, the reasons given by judges
for various legal rules have, beyond a shadow of a doubt, in-
fluenced the subsequent development of these rules. "The rea-
sons found in the Federalist or those given by John Marshall in
Marbury v. Madison or in McCullough v. Maryland have cer-
tainly been a determining factor in the subsequent development
of our constitutional law.130
The point is that conscious and unconscious forces are by
no means mutually exclusive; both are likely to affect judicial
opinions. And, as it is an error to ignore the influence of logic
and reason upon judicial opinions, so is it an error to ignore
the possible influence of unconscious feelings concerning a
judge's father (as well as other unconscious ideas and urges)
upon the opinions that the judge renders.
Parent-symbols-be they judges, courts, or employers-are
by no means the only unconscious symbols of interest to lawyers.
Sibling-symbols, for instance, also deserve the attention of the
bar, for lawyers may unconsciously regard their fellow-lawyers
as siblings. A lawyer may, on an unconscious level, equate the
counsel who opposes him with a sibling who once competed with
him for parental love-and if so, angry and hostile feelings
concerning this sibling are likely to be aroused and to affect
the lawyer's reactions towards the opposing counsel. Indeed,
this may be one of the reasons why undignified squabbles be-
tween lawyers are so frequent, why judges repeatedly find it
34. Schroeder, The Psychologic Study of Judicial Opinions, 6 CALIF. L. REV.
89 (1918).
35. Id. at 95.
36. COHEN, THE RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, REASON AND LAW
183 (1950).
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necessary to remind lawyers of the courtesy and respect that
ought be shown to an opposing counsel.
Observations such as these may appear to have little or no
practical value. Yet they are of use, if only to remind lawyers
that their own behavior is affected by unconscious symbols-
a reminder that may induce them to take a greater interest in,
and perhaps be more sympathetic concerning, the problems of
those who are unconsciously compelled to commit certain crimes
because of the symbolic meaning these crimes have. Klepto-
maniacs and pyromaniacs are typical of such unfortunates-
and their behavior will now be considered in detail.
Kleptomaniacs are ruled by a compulsive and unconsciously
motivated urge to steal. Unlike most thieves, however, klepto-
maniacs often have no ostensible need for the articles they steal
and may throw them away after stealing them.
"In kleptomanics, we have individuals who steal, but their
stealing has a number of important differences from ordi-
nary theft. For one thing, the purely predatory element
present in common theft is lacking here. The subject steals
not because of the value and the money he gets from the
stolen article-that is, not for their mercenary value-but
entirely for what they mean to him emotionally and symboli-
cally. One often observes this in rich women who have no
need for the article they steal.13 7
In like manner, pyromaniacs are driven by a compelling urge
to set fires, an urge they usually find extremely difficult to
resist.
"When the patient was asked to explain how he felt when
setting fires, he said, 'it comes on me all of a sudden. I'll
be walking down the street and something comes over me.
I even may be whistling. He said that the impulse was
tremendously powerful. He had often tried to resist, realiz-
ing that it is a terrible thing to do. He would struggle with
himself until he got so weak that he was wet with perspira-
tion and had to sit down .... Occasionally he succeeded in
restraining himself, but he generally felt forced to yield.
As soon as he had set the fire he felt calm-his terrifying
anxiety was gone.138
37. Karpman, Criminality, In8anity and the Law, 39 J. CRIm. L. & C. 590
(1949).
38. GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 58-59 (1952).
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Unlike the typical arsonist, a pyromaniac generally sets fires
neither for material gain nor out of a conscious desire for
revenge. Rather, motivated by unconscious emotional urgen-
cies, the pyromaniac is usually unable to explain why he acts
as he does.3 9
To detail the reasons why kleptomaniacs steal and pyro-
maniacs set fires would require a discussion of impulse neuroses
and related emotional disorders, 40 a discussion foreign to the
purposes and scope of this paper. Relevant here, however, is
the psychoanalytic discovery that the articles a kleptomaniac
steals or the fires a pyromaniac sets symbolize something that
the kleptomaniac or pyromaniac unconsciously craves.
If the kleptomaniac is a woman, as is usually the case, she
may unconsciously equate what she steals with the male phallus-
a phallus that, as a little girl, she is likely to have seen (on
a baby brother or on another little boy) and have envied.41
Most frequently, perhaps, the articles she steals unconsciously
symbolize the love and affection she longed for, but somehow
never received enough of, during childhood-love and affection
she once may have wanted to take by force from her mother.42
To a pyromaniac, and to other persons as well, fire has an
unconscious symbolic meaning. Typically, fire is unconsciously
equated with love. 43  For the pyromaniac, however, setting a
fire often helps to gratify-albeit symbolically-an imperious
unconscious demand for sexual gratification, a demand rooted
in the erotic urges of childhood. 44 As David Abrahamsen has
pointed out: "Firesetting is a substitute for a sexual thrill, and
the devastating and destructive powers of fire reflect the in-
tensity of the pyromaniac's sexual desires. '45
In short, pyromaniacs and kleptomaniacs commit-what are
for them-symbolic crimes. And they commit these crimes in
response to compelling unconscious demands.
39. Simmel, Incendiarism, in SEARCHLIGHTS ON DELINQUENCY 90 (Eissler ed.
1949).
40. See GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 56-57 (1952);
FENICHEL, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSIS 367-72 (1945).
41. For a description of basic psychoanalytic discoveries concerning penis-
envy, see FREUD, AN OUTLINE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 97-99 (1949).
42. See FRIEDLANDER, THE PSYCHOANALYTIC APPROACH TO JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY 130 (1960).
43. NUNBERG, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 14 (1955).
44. There is an as yet insufficiently understood connection between pyromania
and the urethral-eroticism of children. See Ferenezi, Composite Formations of
Erotic and Character Traits, in FURTHER CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY AND
TECHNIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 257-59 (1951).
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Despite this, the criminal law fails, by and large, to distin-
guish between pyromaniacs or kleptomaniacs and vicious pre-
datory criminals. Rules that protect the insane (the "Mc-
Naghten Rules," 46 for example) are, in the main, no more
applicable to kleptomaniacs or pyromaniacs than to the ordinary
criminal, for kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs are usually neu-
rotic and not psychotic or insane.47  Admittedly, statutes in
about a dozen states exonerate defendants whose crimes are the
product of a so-called "irresistible impulse" ;48 and it has been
argued (and some courts have held) that these statutes are
broad enough to include both psychotic and neurotic com-
pulsions. 49 But these statutes were originally intended to apply
to the insane (psychotic) only ;50 and even as a semantic matter,
the thefts committed by neurotic kleptomaniacs and the fires
set by neurotic pyromaniacs ordinarily defy characterization as
the products of an "irresistible impulse."
"Irresistible implies that the person was absolutely unable
to resist; impulse suggests an urge that is sudden and over-
whelming but momentary. Such conditions exist-for ex-
ample, in the irrational acts of confused epileptics, paretics,
and schizophrenics-but they are rare." 5'
Further-and perhaps most important-defendants rarely try
(except in homicide prosecutions) to invoke the protection of
irresistible impulse laws, for acquittal under them is usually
followed by commitment to a mental hospital for an indefinite
period of time.52 Thus laws concerning insanity (including the
irresistible impulse statutes in force in about a dozen states)
have comparatively little effect upon the criminal law's treat-
45. ABRAHAMSEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME 129 (1960).
46. See CLARK & MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMES 336-83 (6th ed., Wingersky rev.
1958).
47. ABRAHAMSEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIME 127 (1960) ; Karpman, Cri-
minality, Insanity and the Law, 39 J. CRIM. L. & C. 590 (1949).
48. GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 409n (1952):
"The irresistible impulse test has been accepted in Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan,
Montana, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia, and perhaps also in Massachusetts, New
Mexico, Ohio, and Wyoming, although the decisions in a few of these states are
somewhat ambiguous." But see HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
491 (2d ed. 1960).
49. Davidson, Irresistible Impulse and Criminal Responsibility, in CRIME AND
INSANITY 30, 47 (Nice ed. 1958).
50. Davidson, Irresistible Impulse and Criminal Responsibility, in CRIME AND
INSANITY 30, 47 (Nice ed. 1958).
51. GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 410 (1952).
52. Id. at 422.
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ment of kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs-a treatment basically
the same as that accorded the ordinary criminal.
For the law to do this, however, for the law to treat klepto-
maniacs and pyromaniacs as though they were ordinary cri-
minals, and accordingly, to punish kleptomaniacs and pyro-
maniacs with the usual jail sentences given to thieves and
arsonists is, in certain significant ways, useless, unjust, and
dangerous.
Sending kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs to prison is certainly
a useless way of trying to reform or rehabilitate them. As
pointed out above, kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs are often
beset by compulsive unconscious urges for sexual gratification
and love, urges they unconsciously try to fulfill symbolically
by stealing or setting fires. Imprisonment, however, fails to
satisfy these urges; instead, it intensifies them, for imprison-
ment is likely to be interpreted as a rejection 53-and being
rejected by society is an extremely painful psychic experience,
especially for those kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs whose cri-
mes are an unconscious symbolic attempt to gain love and af-
fection. Thus sending kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs to jail
probably aggravates and strengthens than ameliorates and
weakens the unconscious urges that originally provoked their
crimes-and thereby increases the likelihood that when these
kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs are released from prison, they
will, in an effort to satisfy the unconscious urges that beset
them, break the law more frequently than in the past.54
As imprisonment is a useless method of trying to reform
kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs, so is the threat of imprison-
ment useless as a means of deterring them from stealing and
setting fires. Before committing a crime, some criminals may
coolly weigh the gains it is expected to bring against the legal
penalty it is likely to incur, and may decide on this basis
whether the crime ought be committed. 55 But a kleptomaniac
53. See Davidson, Irresistible Impulse and Criminal Responsibility, in CRIME
AND INSANITY 1 (Nice ed. 1958).
54. Many criminologists and psychiatrists have reached similar conclusion
regarding the effect of prison life upon the ordinary criminal. Like Edwin H.
Sutherland, they have concluded that prison life is "conducive to the retention and
development of criminal attitudes, rather than to reformation." SUTHERLAND,
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 504 (5th ed. 1955).
55. That criminals so act is a theory most closely associated with the name
of Jeremy Bentham. See, e.g., BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION (various
editions).
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or pyromaniac normally fails-indeed, is usually unable-to act
in this manner. For one thing, he is ordinarily unaware of the
unconscious objectives of his crimes (what his crimes un-
consciously symbolize) ; and is therefore unable to evaluate
these objectives and to determine if they are worth pursuing.
Also, his crimes are generally committed in response to imperious
unconscious demands-unconscious urgencies that overwhelm
the protests of logic and reason and compel acquiescence. The
kleptomaniac or pyromaniac is, in short, unlike the ordinary
criminal who is presumably capable of balancing the expected
rewards from a crime against the legal punishment for it.5e
Rather, the kleptomaniac or pyromaniac is usually a poor wretch
who, unable to resist the unconscious demands that beset him,
often steals worthless articles or sets profitless fires, and in
so doing exposes himself to the danger of arrest, imprisonment,
or worse.
Not only is the threatened or actual jailing of kleptomaniacs
and pyromaniacs frequently useless, but it is often unjust as
well-at least, insofar as the thefts of kleptomaniacs and the
fires set by pyromaniacs are unconsciously determined and not
the products of free will.
Whether man has a significant degree of free will-or
indeed, any free will at all-is surely debatable, and perhaps
unknowable as well.5 7 Yet a belief in free will has been woven
into the fabric of the law-and certainly plays a large part in
the penal law.58 To this very day, juries are called upon to
determine whether an allegedly criminal act was "done with
56. The extent to which even ordinary criminals can or do balance the expected
gains from a crime against the legal punishment for it has probably been greatly
exaggerated. See, e.g., SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 288 (5th ed.
1955).
57. For a brief and clear exposition of the philosophical arguments for and
against the existence of free will, see HOSPERs, AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSO-
PHIICAL ANALYSIS 262-75 (1953). It is sometimes asserted that the discoveries
of Freud and his followers have refuted all free-will theories of philosophy. See,
e.g., Green, The Concept of Responsibility, 33 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 392-94 (1943).
This assertion is erroneous, however. Psychoanalytic discoveries have admittedly
revealed that more behavior is determined than had previously been supposed, that
draems and a number of other psychic events are often determined. By no means,
however, have these discoveries shown that all behavior is determined, or even
that dreams (or other psychic events) are always determined. Further, certain
major psychoanalytic tenets such as Freud's theories concerning the healthy ego
are incompatible with determinism and imply the existence of some degree of
free will. See FREUD, NFW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 108-12.
(1933).
58. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 455 (2d ed. 1960). "Free
will is the chief cornerstone of the criminal law." GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 4 (1952).
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evil intent (mens rea) for which there is criminal responsibility,
or was the product of a mental condition that makes the act
not one of free will, and hence not criminally punishable." 59
That kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs have no will at all, that
they lack even a modicum of ability to conform their behavior
to legal standards-this hardly seems likely. Nevertheless,
kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs are, indisputably, far less able
than the ordinary person-or even the ordinary criminal-to
prevent themselves from committing antisocial acts. A klepto-
maniac or pyromaniac may, at first, resist the inner urgencies
that beset him; and may, for a time, succeed in preventing
himself from stealing or setting fires. Sooner or later, however,
these urgencies become too powerful: they overwhelm his will
and force him to commit crimes that, as has been seen, usually
make sense only as symbolic fulfillments of unconscious needs.
Now if, as pointed out above, the penal law regards the
existence of a malevolent will and the freedom to decide whether
or not to commit a crime as prerequisites of criminal liability;
and if, as seems likely, kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs possess
not a malevolent will but rather a weak and defective will, a
will unable to resist or to control unconscious urgencies; then
treating kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs as though they possess
the same freedom of choice or free will that the law presumes
guides the conduct of the ordinary man, and punishing these
seriously ill persons with the usual jail sentences given to pre-
datory thieves and arsonists, is surely unjust.
But are not the lives and property of society's more normal
and law-abiding citizens entitled to protection? And if so, does
not society have the right-nay, the duty-to imprison thieves
and arsonists, though they be kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs?
More than eighty years ago, Holmes pointed out that "No
society has ever admitted that it could not sacrifice individual
welfare to its own existence." 60  And many patient-oriented
psychiatrists and psychoanalysts have since concluded, albeit
reluctantly, that the protection of society forbids the exculpation
of such potentially dangerous neurotic offenders as klepto-
maniacs and pyromaniacs.
"It seems clear that if the neurotic compulsion is traumatizing
59. Sobeloff, From McNaghten to Durham and Beyond, in CRIME AND INSANITY
145 (Nice ed. 1958).
60. HOLMES, TnE CommoN LAW 43 (1881).
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or dangerous, the defendant should not be exculpated. From
the patient-oriented doctor's viewpoint this may be a harsh
gospel. But the protection of society really does require
it."61
But treating kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs in the same
manner as ordinary criminals, and sending seriously ill klepto-
maniacs and pyromaniacs back into society after what may have
been a relatively short jail term-this is an extraordinarily
dangerous procedure. Imprisonment, as has been pointed out,
can easily aggravate and strengthen the unconscious cravings
that beset kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs, cravings that all
too frequently find symbolic satisfaction in stealing and setting
fires. Hence, a kleptomaniac or pyromaniac who has been
released from prison may be more of a social menace than ever
before. Because of this, it is more than dangerous, it is unthink-
able, to follow a procedure that begins by aggravating the
unconscious cravings that assail kleptomaniacs or pyromaniacs-
and that ends by sending these neurotic offenders back into the
mainstream of society, thereby giving them the freedom and
opportunity to commit the very crimes that assuage symbolically
their unconscious cravings.
To summarize: imprisoning a kleptomaniac or pyromaniac
on the same basis as an ordinary thief or arsonist is, in certain
significant ways, useless, unjust, and dangerous. But how, then,
ought these neurotic offenders be treated? How can the law
protect kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs (they are, after all,
unfortunates ruled by unconscious forces that compel them to
steal articles that are often worthless and to set fires that are
often profitless)-how can the law treat kleptomaniacs and
pyromaniacs with fairness and understanding, and at the same
time protect society against the crimes they inevitably commit?
Conjuring up grandiose and elaborate methods of trying to
accomplish this is not at all difficult. For instance, it is
theoretically possible for boards of psychiatrists to examine
practically everybody in the United States; for these boards to
decide who among those examined are actual or potential klepto-
maniacs or pyromaniacs; for the boards to determine which of
these actual or potential offenders ought receive psychiatric
61. Davidson, Irresistible Impulse and Criminal Responsibility, in CRIME AND
INSANITY 44 (Nice ed. 1958). See ALEXANDER & STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, TE
JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC xiii (1956).
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treatment, which offenders ought be institutionalized, and so
on. But even if this or a similar plan were feasible; even if a
sufficient number of experts were found to staff these boards,
and in addition, the public's cooperation were obtained-even
then, such a plan would inevitably prove cumbersome, time-
consuming, and extraordinarily expensive; and most important,
it would undoubtedly violate traditional values and existing legal
rights.6 2 Because of all this, a desirable method of handling
kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs is likely to be one that would
maximize the use of existing legal facilities, one that would
depart as little as possible from accepted legal practices.
Consider, therefore, a comparatively simple procedure, a
procedure that would begin with a determination of whether
or not an offender was a kleptomaniac or pyromaniac-a deter-
mination to be made only if and when this offender had been
tried and convicted of theft or arson (in the traditional manner
prescribed in the criminal law), but before he had been sentenced.
In short, after the completion of a trial in which a defendant
had enjoyed all the traditional safeguards offered by the criminal
law, but had nonetheless been found guilty of theft or arson-
after this trial, but before sentence was pronounced, a board
of qualified psychiatrists would attempt to determine whether
or not the defendant was a kleptomaniac or pyromaniac. 63
If a board ruled that the defendant was not a kleptomaniac
or pyromaniac (the probable finding concerning most thieves
and arsonists), then the usual penal sanction for robbery or
arson would be imposed upon him. But if the board concluded
that the defendant was a kleptomaniac or pyromaniac, then
he would be sent to a correctional institution for an indeter-
minate period of time-indeterminate, however, only within
the maximum and minimum prison terms now prescribed by
law for the offense committed. For example, if robbery were
now punishable in a certain state by imprisonment for no more
than twenty years and for no less than two years, then a
kleptomaniac convicted in this state would be sentenced to a
62. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 57 (2d ed. 1960).
63. Pre-sentence psychiatric examinations have been used extensively in juvenile
courts and are now employed in a number of criminal courts as well. Reinemann,
The Eopansion of the Juvenile Court Idea, in THE JUVENILE OFFENDER: PERSPEo-
TIVE AND READINGS 286-87 (Vedder ed. 1954). Indeed, in Massachusetts (under
the Briggs Law) and in several other states, certain defendants receive a psy-
chiatric examination even before their trial begins. GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFFl1,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 259-61 (1952).
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correctional institution for an indefinite term, but in no event
for less than two years or for more than twenty years.
While in the correctional institution, the kleptomaniac or
pyromaniac would receive appropriate psychiatric treatment.
Hopefully, this treatment would prove sufficiently effective to
root out the unconscious causes of his antisocial behavior. And
when the governing body of the correctional institution found
that the offender no longer had a compulsive desire to steal or
to set fires, he would be released.
But suppose that the psychiatric help given the kleptomaniac
or pyromaniac proved only partially successful-or was, indeed,
completely unsuccessful. In either event, he would presumably
be confined in the correctional institution (or possibly be sent
to a custodial institution) until the maximum term of his indeter-
minate sentence had expired; and only then would he be released.
It is true that once again he would be a menace to society
(though not as great a menace as before if partially cured).
Nevertheless, his confinement in the correctional institution
would have kept him from stealing or setting fires for the maxi-
mum number of years society permits for incarcerating even
the most hardened thieves and arsonists. And upon his release
from the institution, some provision could probably be made
for keeping him under surveillance, thereby minimizing the
threat he poses to society.
Now just as an upper limit on the number of years for which
a kleptomaniac or pyromaniac can be sent to a correctional insti-
tution-just as this upper limit helps to protect the offender
against an unduly long confinement in an institution (against
what has been called the "tyranny of experts" 64) so does a lower
limit on the indeterminate sentence given a kleptomaniac or
pyromaniac help to reassure and to protect society. First of all,
sending kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs to a correctional institu-
tion for an indeterminate period having a specific minimum term
helps to reassure the public that, at least during this minimum
term, society need not concern itself with possible depredations
by these offenders. Also, a minimum commitment term helps
to protect society against malingerers-thieves and arsonists
64. See HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 57 (2d ed. 1960). What
worries many lawyers is the possibility that a neurotic may, after committing a
petty theft or other minor offense, be confined in an institution for a dispropor-
tionate number of years-perhaps for the rest of his life.
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who are able to pretend they are kleptomaniacs or pyromaniacs;
and who, after being committed to a correctional institution,
would presumably show a rapid and remarkable "improvement."
It is possible, of course, that a real kleptomaniac or pyromaniac
may respond so well to psychiatric treatment that he is ready
for release before the minimum term of his commitment expires.
In this event, he can always be paroled (on much the same basis
and in much the same manner) as are convicts who serve regular
prison terms.65
Needless to say, the procedure for handling kleptomaniacs
and pyromaniacs outlined in the preceding pages leaves many
questions unanswered. For instance, is it really advisable to
deal with both kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs in the same
manner? After all, do not pyromaniacs pose a far greater
threat to society than 'kleptomaniacs? And suppose that a
kleptomaniac or pyromaniac unintentionally kills somebody while
stealing or committing arson. Would not an outraged public
require that he be treated like an ordinary thief or arsonist-
and accordingly, demand that he be indicted for murder under
the felony-murder rule? These and similar questions surely
deserve serious and extended consideration. Yet regardless of
how such questions are answered, it is indisputable that klepto-
maniacs and pyromaniacs are sick persons-unfortunates who
are compelled by inner forces to fulfill symbolically certain
unconscious needs. And it is becoming increasingly apparent
that: "Detention and treatment of sick persons rather than
holding them to full accountability comports with our traditional
concept of the dignity of the individual. It takes into due
account the public safety and fully vindicates the proper
interests of public justice. '66
Though concerned to a considerable extent with the problems
of kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs, offenders whose crimes fulfill
symbolically their unconscious needs, this paper has sought
throughout to shed light upon the relationship between law and
unconscious symbolism. To this end, psychoanalytic discoveries
65. State penal laws may fail to specify minimum and/or maximum penal
terms for arson or robbery. The New York Penal Law, for example, fails to
provide a minimum term of imprisonment for arson and for robbery in the second
and third degree. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 244, 2127, 2129. In such cases, the plan
suggested in the text would have to be supplemented by legislation specifying
whatever minimum and/or maximum periods of imprisonment are needed.
66. Sobeloff, From McNaghten to Durham and Beyond, in CRIME AND INSANIy
152 (Nice ed. 1958).
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concerning the universal language of the human race-the
symbolic language of the unconscious-have been presented.
And an attempt has been made to reveal the applicability of
these psychoanalytic discoveries to the law, by touching lightly
upon such diverse areas as admiralty law, real property law,
the law of agency, the conduct of lawyers; and by considering
in greater detail such diverse matters as the symbolic role played
by the Supreme Court, the violence that so frequently erupts
during strikes, the unconscious feelings that may influence a
judge's behavior, and the problem of finding a suitable method
of handling kleptomaniacs and pyromaniacs. Further, certain
reforms have been urged: it has been suggested that courts be
given the injunctive powers needed to quash violence during
strikes; and a plan has been advanced under which klepto-
maniacs and pyromaniacs would be sent to a correctional institu-
tion for a period of time consistent with their rights and with
the interests of society.
That this paper has only begun the task of exploring the
relationship between law and unconscious symbolism is patent.
No attempt has been made, for example, to follow up the pos-
sibility that fiduciaries may serve as unconscious parent-sym-
bols, that parent-oriented ideas and feelings may have helped to
mold legal rules concerning the rights and duties of trustees,
guardians, and the like. Nevertheless, the material presented
does offer a basis upon which lawyers can begin to find out
how, and to what extent, unconscious symbolism has influenced
the law-a basis upon which lawyers can begin to determine
whether or not the influence of unconscious symbolism on the
law is untoward and ought be permitted to continue unchecked
and uncorrected.
